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Abstract. All organizations share data in a carefully managed fashion
by using access control mechanisms. We focus on enforcing access con-
trol by encrypting the data and managing the encryption keys. We make
the realistic assumption that the structure of any organization is a hi-
erarchy of security classes. Data from a certain security class can only
be accessed by another security class, if it is higher or at the same level
in the hierarchy. Otherwise access is denied. Our solution is based on
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. We show, that the theoretical
worst case performance of our solution is slightly better than that of all
other existing solutions. We also show, that our performance in practical
cases is linear in the size of the hierarchy, whereas the best results from
the literature are quadratic.
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1 Introduction
It has been estimated that the world currently produces five Exabytes (i.e.
5 × 1018 bytes) of digital content annually [13]. We may assume that (1) most
of this information is stored on a large number of servers connected to the In-
ternet, and (2) for business and privacy reasons, each item of content should be
accessible only to a carefully controlled group of people. Classical access con-
trol mechanisms assume that the server can be trusted to enforce access control
policies. While this is a realistic assumption for relatively small databases, with
(1) the growing amounts of data being produced, and (2) the trend to outsource
both data and processes, trusting the server becomes less realistic.
Fortunately, data can be stored securely on an untrusted server when the
data is encrypted. Access control then boils down to managing the encryp-
tion keys. The server processes only encrypted data, and the user performs the
en/decryption; the server never even sees the plaintext, or the keys. In most
applications, access control is hierarchical; for example the CEO of a company
has (at least in principle) access to all company information, the CFO only to
all financial information etc. Therefore to provide access control over encrypted
data we have to solve the problem of hierarchical key management. The naive so-
lution would give the CEO the keys to each item of information; the CFO would
get the subset of all keys that decrypt the financial records etc. Given the large
numbers of keys involved, this is unworkable, so many sophisticated schemes
have emerged, each basically calculating keys deeper in the hierarchy. There are
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methods based on modular exponentiation top down [1, 9] or bottom up [8, 6].
Some of the approaches derive from the idea of sealed keys [12, 5, 3], others
avoid public key cryptography by attaching public parameters to the edges of
the hierarchy, instead of to the classes [7, 15]. Assuming that there are n nodes
in the access control hierarchy, the spatial efficiency of an access control scheme
is determined by its private and public parameters, which are de facto private
and public keys assigned to (the nodes of) the hierarchy. To be more precise, the
private/public space complexity of a key generation scheme, is the number of all
private/public keys assigned to (the nodes of) the hierarchy. The computational
complexity is the time needed to perform the key derivation step.
Our contribution is twofold. Firstly we develop a new hierarchical key man-
agement scheme for access control based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which
has a worst case public space complexity of O(n
2 log log n
log n ), whereas all other
proposals have at least O(n2). Secondly, our work is the first to also provide
a practical evaluation of the proposed access control scheme. In particular, we
study four realistic application scenarios, showing that in each case our scheme
has a practical space and computational complexity of O(n).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related
work. Section 3 presents the scheme for a certain class of hierarchies. Section
4 generalizes the scheme to arbitrary hierarchies. Section 5 presents application
scenarios and tests for our scheme. We summarize the contributions of our paper
in Section 6.
2 Related work
In almost all schemes for access control in a hierarchy, there is a relationship
between the key assigned to a node and the keys assigned to its children. The
difference between proposed methods lies mostly in the different cryptographic
solutions used for the key generation. We outline a few important approaches in
this area below.
One of the early solutions to the hierarchical access control problem by Akl
and Taylor [1] is based on modular exponentiation top-down. The authors choose
the exponents in such a way, that the key of a child node can be derived from
the key of its parent. MacKinnon et al. [9] optimize the scheme by choosing less
space consuming exponents. However, even for optimized parameters, the public
space required remains exponential in the number of nodes.
Hwang and Yang [6] present a scheme that improves the scheme of Akl and
Taylor. This scheme is also based on modular exponentiation, but the novelty is
the bottom-up approach. The space complexity remains exponential.
Lin, Hwang and Chang [8] also propose a scheme based on modular exponen-
tiation, bottom-up. This scheme solves the problem of exponential public space
requirement. The public space complexity becomes O(n2 log n).
Sandhu [12] proposes a key generation scheme for a tree hierarchy. The so-
lution is based on using different one-way functions to generate the key for each
child node in the hierarchy. The one-way function is selected based on the name
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of the child. When a new child is added, the keys for the ancestors do not have to
be recomputed. Hwang [5] proposes a solution for the general poset. The advan-
tage of this approach is its flexibility. The space required for public parameters
is quadratic.
Ray et al. [11] present a scheme, for which the key derivation time is con-
stant. This is achieved using modular exponentiation with the same power for
all classes, but each class uses a different derivation modulus. The scheme is
interesting from a theoretical point of view. However, the efficiency problem is
pushed to private space, which becomes exponential. This means, that users
themselves must store huge keys.
Das et al. [3] propose a scheme based on polynomial interpolation. A secret
key derivation phase requires the user to interpolate a polynomial associated
with a node. The space complexity is also quadratic.
Zhong [15] and Lin [7] propose schemes not based on public key cryptog-
raphy. The public parameters are associated with edges of the graph instead
of nodes. Therefore the public space required is quadratic. Avoiding public key
cryptography results in computational efficiency of the key derivation phase.
In Table 1 we summarize the performance of existing approaches. Apart from
the Ray et al. [11] scheme, which is unacceptable because of its private space
complexity, all the solutions require at least O(e) = O(n2) public space, where
e is the number of edges in the hierarchy.
Table 1. Comparison of some existing methods, e = O(n2) is the number of edges,
and h = O(n) is the height of the hierarchy
Scheme Public Space Private Space Comput. Compl.
Akl,Taylor O((n log n)n × n) O(n) O(n)
Hwang,Yang O((n log n)n × n) O(n) O(n)
Lin,Hwang,Chang O(n2 log n) O(n) O(n)
Sandhu,Hwang O(e) = O(n2) O(n) O(h)
Ray 0 O((n log n)n × n) O(1)
Das O(e) = O(n2) O(n) O(h)
Lin, Zhong O(e) = O(n2) O(n) O(h)
3 Scheme Description
For simplicity we assume the existence of a Central Authority (CA). The respon-
sibility of the CA is to generate and distribute keys. Initially, the CA assigns to
each user class two keys: a private key, and the accompanying public key that
will be available to all user classes. The system could function without a CA,
requiring a distributed assignment of public keys and authenticated channels.
The public keys are used to derive the secret keys of other user classes one is
allowed to access. The secret key is also needed for this, as well as for allowing
access to the encryption/decryption key for the documents.
We first present our scheme for a specific class of posets. Then we describe
how to generalize the scheme to arbitrary posets. Appendix A summarizes basic
definitions from order theory, used further in this section.
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Fig. 1. Example of a cover various V-poset P used as example (left) and a non V-poset
(middle) embedded into V-poset (right)
From now on we represent a class hierarchy as a poset, whose elements rep-
resent classes of users. All the algorithms presented further operate on a poset,
that is the algorithms are given as input a set of elements, and the relations be-
tween the elements. We operate on an abstract structure Poset P representing
poset P = (H,<H). Structure Poset P contains an abstract structure Node x
for every element x ∈ H of the poset P , and an abstract structure Edge (x,y) for
every relation x <H y in P . We use the following standard operations on Poset
P :
– LeftParent(Poset P, Node x) - returns the first node that covers x.
– RightParent(Poset P, Node x) - returns the last node that covers x.
– InsertEdge(Poset P, Node x, Node y) - adds a relation x <H y to P .
– CreateNode(Poset P) - creates a new node in P and returns it.
It is worth to note here, that while the algorithms operate on posets, for the
sake of simplicity the illustrations show the Hasse diagrams of these posets.
The algorithms use an external FIFOqueue Q, with standard operations
Push(FIFOqueue Q, Node x), Pop(FIFOqueue Q) and Size(FIFOqueue Q).
3.1 Scheme for cover various V-posets
We first present our scheme for cover various V-posets. A cover various V-poset
is a poset in which each non-maximal node has exactly two parents, and where
no two nodes have the same covering set. Later we will generalize it to arbitrary
posets. The V-structure allows us to use the two party Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change protocol [4]. Each non-maximal node has exactly two parents, which can
establish the child key using the DH protocol. This requires knowledge of the
secret key of one of the parents, and the public key of the other parent. Therefore
the security of our scheme is directly dependent on the security of DH. The fact
that the input poset is cover various ensures that no two nodes obtain the same
key.
In this section we present algorithms to assign and derive the keys.
Key Assignment. Algorithm KeyAssignment(Poset P) operates on a cover
various V-poset P = (H,<H), representing the class hierarchy. It assigns private
and public keys to the nodes of P . This algorithm is run once by the CA at the
beginning of the systems lifetime. Therefore the computational complexity of
Vthis step is not a significant factor. The space required for the generated keys is
the crucial issue and should be minimized.
After completing this algorithm each Node x is labeled with two keys: Sx -
its private key, and Px - its public key.
The KeyAssignment(Poset P) algorithm
p := LargePrime; g := random([2..p− 1]);
for each node x ∈Max(P ) do
Sx := random([2..p− 1]); //secret key
Px := g
Sxmod p; od; //public key
for each node x ∈ H \Max(P ) do
Sl := SecretKey(LeftParent(P, x)); //only available to the CA
Sr := SecretKey(RightParent(P, x)); //only available to the CA
Sx := g
SlSrmod p;
Px := g
Sxmod p; od;
Key Derivation. To derive a key of a descendant node, a node needs its own
secret key, as well as the public keys of the “other” parents in the path to the
target node. It will recursively look for a path to the target, and derive child keys
by calculating Schild = P
Sparent
otherparent recursively. This KeyDerivation algorithm is
run by the users whenever they need to derive keys. Therefore the computational
complexity of this procedure is an important factor of the scheme efficiency. To
be precise, the complexity is O(h), where h is the height of the input poset.
Example. For the hierarchy P presented in Figure 1 (left), the procedure
KeyAssignment(P) generates the following keys.
Node 1 2 3 4 5
Secret key random S1 random S2 S3 = g
S1S2 random S4 S5 = g
S3S4
Public key P1 = g
S1 P2 = g
S2 P3 = g
S3 P4 = g
S4 P5 = g
S5
The key derivation of key S5 from key S1 results in computing the child key
S3 = P
S1
2 . Then the key of the child of node 3 is computed as S5 = P
S3
4 .
Complexity. The scheme presented above creates n private and public keys,
therefore both public and private space complexity is O(n). The computational
complexity of the scheme is O(h), where h stands for the height of the poset.
4 Adaptation for Arbitrary Posets
In reality, V-posets are rare, especially if they should also be cover various.
Therefore in this section we generalize our scheme to arbitrary posets.
The general idea of the solution is to embed arbitrary posets into cover various
V-posets, by inserting virtual nodes. Figure 1 shows in the middle a poset where
all nodes at the bottom have three parents. The poset to the right has been
extended with one virtual node v, so that each non-maximal node has exactly
two parents. The relations between the original nodes, however, remain the same
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Fig. 2. Flow diagram of the embedding algorithms
after insertion. We call an embedding algorithm satisfying this invariant a proper
embedding.
For virtual nodes we do not need to store the private keys, therefore the
embedding step does not affect the private space complexity. However, the public
space complexity is linear in the number of all nodes, original plus virtual. The
complexity of the key derivation increases if the height of the embedded poset
increases. The question arises how many virtual nodes must be inserted during
the embedding phase, and how the height increases. Therefore with each given
procedure we provide the corresponding complexity bounds.
Below we provide two proper embedding algorithms, that embed an arbitrary
poset into a cover various V-poset, to which one can apply the scheme presented
in the previous section. The first method, Phase Embedding, provides a theoret-
ical improvement. The second one, N-free Embedding, refines the first method,
and gives a significant practical improvement over all the other approaches.
Figure 2 shows the flow diagram of applying these embeddings to an arbitrary
poset. The parts of Phase embedding are marked with dashed edges, and those
of N-embedding with solid edges. In the two following sections we present and
analyze Phase Embedding and N-embedding in more detail.
4.1 Phase Embedding
In general, we have to solve three sub-problems to achieve a proper embedding.
First of all, we solve the problem of nodes having more than two parents. Sec-
ondly, we make sure that different nodes, that have the exact same parents get
different keys. This step makes the poset cover various. Lastly, we solve the prob-
lem of nodes with only one parent. These three steps will embed an arbitrary
poset into a cover various V-poset.
Too large covering sets. The main problem we face in arbitrary posets are
nodes with more than two parents. To deal with more than two parents covering
one node, we first present a greedy algorithm that embeds an arbitrary poset
into a poset where each node has at most two parents. The GreedyMakeVs(Poset
P) algorithm performs transformations as shown in Figure 3. The runtime of the
GreedyMakeVs algorithm is at most quadratic in number of nodes, and the upper
bound for the number of inserted virtual nodes is n2. This shows a greedy upper
bound of n2.
The GreedyMakeVs(Poset P) algorithm
for each node x ∈ P with |C(x)| > 2 do
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Fig. 3. GreedyMakeVs example: a structure as shown to the left is substituted by one
as shown to the right
for each node y ∈ C(x) do Push(Q, y); od;
while(Size(Q) > 2) do
y := Pop(Q); z := Pop(Q); v := CreateNode(P );
InsertEdge(P, v, y); InsertEdge(P, v, z);
Push(Q, v); od;
y := Pop(Q); z := Pop(Q);
InsertEdge(P, x, y); InsertEdge(P, x, z); od;
Shared Covering sets. The Coverings(Poset P) algorithm embeds a poset
into a cover various poset. Virtual parents are created for nodes with the same
covering sets. Every virtual parent thus created covers exactly one node, so there
will be no nodes which share the same covering set anymore.
The GreedyMakeVs(Poset P) algorithm makes sure that no node has more
than two parents. Thus we can limit attention to two situations: covering sets
of size 1 and 2.
The Coverings(Poset P) algorithm
for each node x ∈ P with C(x) 6= ∅ do
if (|C(x)| = 1) then for each node (y ∈ P : y 6= x, C(y) = C(x)) do
v := CreateNode(P );
InsertEdge(P, y, v); od;
if (|C(x)| = 2) then for each node (y ∈ P : y 6= x, C(y) = C(x)) do
p = LeftParent(P, x);
v := CreateNode(P ); w := CreateNode(P );
InsertEdge(P, y, v); InsertEdge(P, v, p); InsertEdge(P, v, w); od;
od;
The GreedyMakeVs(Poset P) algorithm does not interfere with the algorithm
Coverings(Poset P), since virtual nodes added there will never have the same
covering set as another node (whether original or virtual). Thus we can bound
the number of inserted virtual nodes by 2n, where n is the number of nodes in
the original poset.
Bridges. The EliminateBridges(Poset P) algorithm eliminates bridges. A single
virtual node is created and becomes a parent for every bridge. External function
Bridge(Poset P, Node x) used in this algorithm, returns true if node x is a bridge
in P , and false otherwise. The EliminateBridges algorithm has a runtime linear
in the number of nodes, and inserts one virtual node.
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The EliminateBridges(Poset P) algorithm
v := CreateNode(P );
for each node x in P ; do
if (Bridge(P, x)) then InsertEdge(P, x, v); od;
Theorem 1 Applying the GreedyMakeVs, Coverings and EliminateBridges al-
gorithms in order to an arbitrary poset P results in a proper embedding of P
into a cover various V-poset.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix C.
Main Theoretical Result. The crucial step in the embedding algorithm is
how to deal with more than two parents. The greedy algorithm GreedyMakeVs
shown above actually looks at edges, instead of nodes - hence the upper bound
of n2. The two following theorems give bounds on the number of virtual nodes
that need to be added in this step.
First we consider the theoretical minimum number of virtual nodes necessary
to add in the worst case.
Theorem 2 Consider an embedding E that embeds arbitrary posets of n ele-
ments into posets where every node is covered by at most two other nodes. Then
the number of virtual nodes added by E is in the worst case at least n216 logn .
This theorem shows that an arbitrary poset in theory requires quite a lot
of virtual nodes to make a proper embedding. However, the proof (given in
Appendix C) does not provide a concrete example where the bound is attained.
Later we will see that practical cases require less virtual nodes.
An upper bound on the needed virtual complexity is given by the next the-
orem.
Theorem 3 There exists an embedding E that embeds arbitrary posets of n el-
ements into a poset where every node is covered by at most two other nodes,
adding cn
2 log logn
logn virtual nodes (where c is a constant).
Unfortunately, the proof of this theorem is only partly constructive. Certain
structures, namely complete bipartite subposets are guaranteed to be present as a
sub-poset (if the poset is sufficiently dense), but they still have to be located. For
more details we refer to Appendix C. However, the complexity of the embedding
algorithm is not an issue here, so if necessary we can afford the CA to perform
an exhaustive search for these structures during the setup phase. This means,
that such a MakeVs algorithm adds at most cn
2 log logn
logn virtual nodes.
The number of virtual nodes added in the Phase Embedding algorithm is the
sum of the numbers added during the three steps presented above. Therefore
the number of virtual nodes inserted is at most cn
2 log log n
logn + 2n + 1, which is
dominated by the first term. The public space complexity of the scheme combined
with Phase Embedding is therefore O(n
2 log logn
logn ). This improves the best known
space complexity O(n2).
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Fig. 4. N structure (left) and an example of QSP substitution (right)
4.2 N-embedding
As already briefly discussed in the previous section, being able to locate complete
bipartite subposets is highly beneficial. For embedding these into cover various V-
posets our Phase Embedding algorithm requires a linear number of virtual nodes.
An efficient method for decomposing a poset into complete bipartite subposets
exists in the literature (e.g. QSP decomposition [10]), but it only works on a
specific class of posets, namely N-free posets. Thus, if we can efficiently make
a poset N-free, we can apply the QSP decomposition. Then we can apply an
optimized version of our Phase Embedding algorithm on the located complete
bipartite subposets, as shown in Figure 4 (right).
In this section we present an efficient algorithm that embeds an N-free poset
into a cover various V-poset increasing the size n by δn = O(n), and increasing
the height h by δh = O(min(h log(n−h+ 1), n)). We end up with an algorithm
that embeds any poset into an N-free poset, adding δn = O(N) virtual nodes,
where N stands for the number of N-spinning edges in the input poset, and
increasing the height h by δh = O(h). This gives an efficient solution for posets
with a small number of N-spinning edges. In section 5 we show, that in practical
hierarchies the number of N-spinning edges is indeed linear in n.
The N-poset is a poset on four elements a, b, c, d with a ≺ b, d ≺ b, d ≺ c and
a||c, a||d, c||b, as shown in Figure 4 (left). An N-spinning edge is the edge between
b and d. An N-free poset does not contain any N in its Hasse diagram. For more
definitions and notations corresponding to N-free posets, eg. the definition of a
Quasi Series Parallel (QSP) poset and a QSP decomposition tree of a poset, we
refer to Appendix B. The following theorem is the basis for the algorithm we
present.
Theorem 4 P is QSP if and only if P is N-free. [10]
Embedding N-free posets. We have now all the necessary tools to introduce
an embedding algorithm for N-free posets. The abstract structure we introduce
here is QSPtree T, which is a representation of a QSP decomposition tree (see
Appendix B) of a poset P we operate on. The nodes of the decomposition tree
are represented with abstract structure QSPtreeNode w. Standard functions for
binary trees, such as Leaf(T,w), LeftChild(T,w) and RightChild(T,w) are used
on QSPtree T.
The recursive algorithm EmbedNfree(QSPtree T,QSPtreeNode w) initially
called with the root node of QSP tree as a parameter, traverses the QSP tree
Xrepresentation T of an input poset P . When the node w ∈ T currently being
visited is a quasi series composition node w = QS(M,N) (see Appendix B), the
algorithm substitutes the complete bipartite subposet on sets M and N with a
V-embedding of this subposet as shown in Figure 4 (right), just as the Phase
Embedding would do in this case.
The EmbedNfree(QSPtree T,QSPtreeNode w) algorithm
if( Leaf(T,w) ) then return w;
else P1 := EmbedNfree(LeftChild(T,w));
P2 := EmbedNfree(RightChild(T,w));
P := P1 ⊕ P2;
if( w is QSP(M,N)-composition ) then
for each node y ∈ N do Push(Q, y); od;
while(Size(Q) > 1) do
x := Pop(Q); y := Pop(Q); v := CreateNode(P );
InsertEdge(P, v, x); InsertEdge(P, v, y);
Push(Q, v); od;
x := Pop(Q);
for each node z ∈M do
v := CreateNode(P );
InsertEdge(P, z, v); InsertEdge(P, z, x); od;
return P ;
Result. The following theorem ensures the correctness of the EmbedNfree algo-
rithm. The proof may be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 5 Each recursive call of EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSPtreeNode w)
returns a cover various V-poset for a poset corresponding to the QSP tree rooted
in w.
Number of Virtual Nodes and Height Increase The two theorems below
provide the complexity properties of algorithm EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSP-
treeNode w). We assume, that the input poset P (V,≤V ) is N-free.
Theorem 6 Let n(P ) = |V | and δn(P ) be the number of virtual nodes inserted
by EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSPtreeNode w). Then δn(P ) ≤ 2n.
Theorem 7 Let h(P ) be the height of poset P and δh(P ) be the increase of
h while performing EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSPtreeNode w). Then δh(P ) ≤
min(h(log(n− h+ 1) + 1), 2n).
Runtime The runtime of the procedure EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSPtreeNode
w) is O(t+ n), where t stands for the size of QSP decomposition tree of a poset
P .
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Eliminating N-posets. We complete this section with an algorithm that is a
proper embedding of an arbitrary poset into an N-free poset.
The algorithm EliminateNs(Poset P) inserts a virtual node on each N-spinning
edge, therefore it eliminates all N-subposets from Hasse diagram of P . Verifying
whether the edge is N-spinning is O(n) in the size of input poset. Therefore
EliminateNs(Poset P) runs in O(n3). It inserts δn = O(N) virtual nodes, where
N stands for a number of N-spinning edges in an input poset. The height is at
most doubled, δh(P ) ≤ h. This is due to the fact, that new nodes are inserted
at most one per an edge, therefore the number of nodes on any chain (also max-
imal) can be at most doubled.
The EliminateNs(Poset P) algorithm
for each pair (x, y) : x ≺ y do // each edge in the Hasse diagram
if( edge (x,y) is N-spinning ) then
v := CreateNode(P );
InsertEdge(x, v); InsertEdge(v, y); od;
Performance parameters of N-embedding. To summarize this section, we
have presented two algorithms, the EliminateNs(Poset P) algorithm and the
EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSPtreeNode w) algorithm, that together constitute N-
embedding, which embeds an arbitrary poset into a cover various V-poset. Table
2 shows the performance of these two algorithms.
We conclude, that the N-embedding adds in total δn(P ) = O(n + N) and
increases the height by δh(P ) = O(min(n+N, h log(n+N − h+ 1))).
Table 2. Performance of EliminateNs and EmbedNfree
δn(P ) δh(P )
Input poset 0 0
After EliminateNs N h
After EmbedNfree 3n min(2n + 2N, 2h(log(n+N + h+ 1) + 1))
5 Applications and Tests
The previous section shows that, from a worst case complexity analysis point
of view, the space complexity of the proposed scheme combined with Phase
Embedding is slightly better than other efficient solutions by a factor O( log log nlogn ).
In this section we present a practical average case analysis showing that, for the
majority of cases the performance of our scheme combined with N-embedding
is linear. We study examples from hierarchies occurring in different practical
situations. The application scenarios for our test occur in industrial and research
settings. In each case we identify a hierarchy in a group of people. The groups
are large enough to analyze the asymptotic behavior of our scheme. We observe
that, for all the test cases the space required for public parameters by the scheme
combined with N-embedding is linear in the size of the input. To the best of our
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knowledge no other proposal has linear public space complexity for average cases.
The private space complexity is still linear for our scheme, like for other schemes.
We assume the existence of a database of documents. There are users, who
have access to different subsets of the documents. The goal is to protect the
data from being viewed by users, who are not allowed to access it. We assume
that the storage for the database is essentially unlimited, and therefore data is
never deleted. This is a realistic assumption, since many organizations need to
have logs of all the transactions ever made (for instance banks), or all versions
of developing projects (for instance software producers).
To challenge our scheme, we submit it to four different application scenarios:
the Erdo¨s Project Scenario, the DBLP Scenario, the Office Hierarchy Scenario
and the PGP Scenario. We describe each in subsequent sections. The Erdo¨s
Project and Office Hierarchy correspond to centralized environments, the other
to decentralized environments. The Erdo¨s project and PGP are based on au-
thority as a social relation and the other two are based on a relationship of peers
created online. Table 3 pictures this classification.
Table 3. Classification of Scenarios
Centralized Decentralized
Peers Erdo¨s PGP
Authority Office DBLP
In the previous sections we showed that there are certain classes of posets for
which our scheme performs better than for the general case. The upper bound
for space complexity is O(n) for N-free posets, where n is the number of nodes
in the poset. We also provided an algorithm to embed an arbitrary poset into
an N-free poset with O(N) space complexity, where N stands for the number of
N-spinning edges. Therefore we count the number of occurrences of N-spinning
edges in each scenario as the most relevant performance parameter.
In each of the following sections we present a summarizing table. The tables
show the number of N-spinning edges in a number of clusters, defined as the
connected graphs in the considered hierarchies. Tests are applied to all the clus-
ters, but in the tables only non trivial clusters are listed. The first row in the
table is the cluster number, the second is the size in nodes, and the third row
contains the number of N-spinning edges.
5.1 DBLP hierarchy
The DBLP (See http://dblp.uni-trier.de/) is a computer science bibliogra-
phy stored in a big database of 675000 papers. Each paper determines a node,
and each set of authors that is a subset of another set of authors determines an
edge. An example is shown in Figure 9 in Appendix D. We apply our scheme to
the hierarchy of articles, with the order given as mentioned above.
Each author receives his own keys, with which he is able to generate the
keys for all his articles. The scheme creates a key for each article. The article
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is encrypted with that key and stored in the database. When an author request
access to an article, the server sends the encrypted version of requested article.
Table 4 shows the counts of N-spinning edges for non trivial clusters of the
DBLP hierarchy. For example cluster number 31 presented in Figure 9 in Ap-
pendix D has 14 nodes, and contains only 2 N-spinning edges.
Table 4. the DBLP N-spinning edges counts
Cluster 1 2 4 11 13 22 23 29 31 33
Size 43 23 968 45 53 76 107 26 14 48
N-sp. e. 3 2 915 1 21 13 116 14 2 66
5.2 Erdo¨s Collaboration Graph
Paul Erdo¨s wrote hundreds of mathematical research papers, many in collabora-
tion with others. His Erdo¨s number is 0. Erdo¨s’ co-authors have Erdo¨s number
1. People other than Erdo¨s who have written a joint paper with someone with
Erdo¨s number 1 but not with Erdo¨s himself, have an Erdo¨s number 2, and
so on. If there is no chain of co-authorships connecting someone with Erdo¨s,
then that persons Erdo¨s number is said to be infinite. The data of Erdo¨s’ co-
authors and their co-authors is gathered by the Erdo¨s Number Project (See
http://www.oakland.edu/enp/). A part of the Erdo¨s hierarchy is shown in
Figure 10 in Appendix D.
We build the following hierarchy. The nodes are single mathematicians. Peo-
ple with lower Erdo¨s numbers are higher in hierarchy - the top member is Paul
Erdo¨s himself. There is an edge from A to B iff A has a bigger Erdo¨s number
than B and there is a chain of articles connecting A to B.
The Erdo¨s hierarchy corresponds to the centralized model of an organization,
where the leader has Erdo¨s number 0, and for all the other staff the Erdo¨s number
indicates how long the line of command is to the top.
Table 5 summarizes the number of N-spinning edges in the Erdo¨s hierarchy.
The clusters are separated after removing Paul Erdo¨s’ node, which connects all
the clusters from the top. An additional fourth row presents the number of all
edges. In every cluster the number of N-spinning edges is less than the number
of nodes, and significantly less than the number of edges.
Table 5. The Erdo¨s Project N-spinning edges counts
Cluster 1 2 4 5 6 7
Size 18 7208 7 63 4 13
N-sp. e. 0 5478 0 8 0 1
Edges 17 10471 6 65 3 12
5.3 PGP trust chains
Following its intention as a ’cryptographic tool for the masses’, PGP (See http:
//www.rubin.ch/pgp/pgp.en.html) breaks the traditional hierarchical trust ar-
chitecture and adopts the ’web of trust’ approach. There is no central authority
XIV
which everybody trusts, but instead individuals sign each others keys and weave
a web of individual public keys interconnected by links formed by these signa-
tures.
We define the trust relation as follows. A trusts B iff A signs B’s key. The
transitive closure of this directed relation gives the trust relation we analyze. An
example is shown in Figure 11 to the left in Appendix D.
We assume, that all users want to keep their data (like name) secret, however
they do not hide this data from entities they trust. Therefore the names and
maybe some other data of the users, are encrypted with the keys, which only
trusted users can generate.
Users lying on a cycle form a circle of mutual trust and are thus indistin-
guishable. Therefore, classes of users that lie on the same cycle in trust relation
become a single node in the trust hierarchy we build. The poset on the resulting
acyclic graph is given based on the trust relations between the cycles. There is
an edge from class A to class B iff users in class B trust users from class A.
Figure 11 shows the original PGP trust net to the left, and how we interpret
the network as a hierarchy to the right. In the hierarchy, original cycles (classes)
are merged into single nodes and original edges are transitively reduced. In the
hierarchy of Figure 11 (right) in Appendix D there is one N-spinning edge.
The user keys and trust relations between them are called keyrings. These
keyrings can be downloaded from the Internet. We separate the connected sub-
graphs (clusters) in every keyring, and analyze all non trivial clusters. The results
are presented in Table 6. The additional fourth row presents the keyring, from
which we took the analyzed cluster. Again, the numbers of N-spinning edges is
always less than the number of nodes.
Table 6. PGP N-spinning edges counts
Cluster 1 1 1 1 3
Size 101 4444 676 42480 10466
N-sp. e. 21 1000 96 29690 1222
Keyring UniZH key debian philadephia current 2002-06-17
signing party keys.pgp.net keys.pgp.net
5.4 Office Scenario
The last practical case concerns the organization of our own faculty (http:
//www.eemcs.utwente.nl), which has 223 academic staff and PostDocs, 260
PhD students, and 176 support staff, totalling 659 people. The faculty has 27
research groups in Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science.
Each of the 27 heads of group has two bosses: the dean and the director of
one of the five research institutes. The academic staff and PostDocs have one
boss: the head of the group. Most PhD students have two bosses: a full professor
and a member of the academic staff. This information allows us to calculate the
maximum number of Ns in the organization: at most one N per PhD student
and exactly one per group, i.e. 27 + 260 = 287, which is less than half the total
number of people in the faculty.
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6 Conclusions
We propose a scheme for generating cryptographic keys in a hierarchy. The
scheme is intended to be used for enforcing access control in encrypted databases.
We provide a worst case complexity analysis showing that the scheme improves
on all other published schemes. Our work is also the first to provide a detailed
practical performance analysis, which shows that our scheme has a linear average
performance for four practical case studies.
The scheme itself works for a narrow class of posets, but we present two
methods to generalize the scheme to work for arbitrary posets. Both methods use
virtual nodes to embed an arbitrary poset into a poset suitable for our scheme.
The Phase Embedding method, based on theoretical results from order theory,
results in an improvement of the worst case space complexity over all other
published solutions. The best related approach has a private space complexity
that is linear in the size n of the hierarchy, and a public space complexity linear
in the number of edges e of the hierarchy (which in the worst case is quadratic
in n). The space complexity of our scheme combined with Phase Embedding is
O(n) for private and O(n2 log lognlogn ) for public space, hence the improvement is
by a (small) factor O( log lognlog n ). Also, the computational worst case cannot be
higher, and will increase by O(h log(n− h+ 1) on average.
The N-embedding method gives a significant practical improvement com-
pared to other solutions. The space complexity is bounded from above by O(n)
private and O(n + N) public space, where N is the number of N -spinning
edges (see section 4.2). Since n < e and N < e, as in N we calculate only
a subset of all edges, O(e) is a guaranteed upper bound for the public space
complexity. The upper bound for the computational complexity is in this case
O(min(n + N, h log(N + n − h + 1))), whereas the best solutions proposed by
other authors yield O(h) in the height h of an input poset.
To show that in practice N is significantly smaller than the number of edges
e, we analyze four real hierarchies. Regardless of the nature of the hierarchy (i.e.
centralized versus decentralized, or peer to peer versus authority based) we find
that N is almost always smaller than the size of hierarchy n, and in only 2 out
of 1343 cases N is of the same order of magnitude as n. Therefore the average
complexity parameters for our scheme are O(n) for both space complexities and
O(min(n, h log(n − h + 1))) for the computational complexity. We present the
obtained complexities in Table 7, where we use the estimate h ≈ logn.
Table 7. Performance complexities
Phase Embedding N-embedding
Private Space Worst Case O(n) O(n)
Private Space Average O(n) O(n)
Public Space Worst Case O(n2 log log n
log n
) O(e) = O(n2)
Public Space Average ? O(n)
Computational Worst Case O(n2 log log n
log n
) O(e) = O(n2)
Computational Average O(log2 n) O(log2 n)
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A Basic Order Theory definitions
Partial Order is a binary relation over a set V which is reflexive, antisym-
metric, and transitive. We denote this relation as ≤V .
Partially Ordered Set (POSet) is a set V with a partial order ≤V given on
it, denoted P = (V,≤V ).
y ∈ V covers x ∈ V iff x <V y, and there is no z such that x <V z <V y.
We denote the covering relation as x ≺V y. The set of nodes covering x is
denoted C(x) = {y ∈ V : x ≺V y}.
y ∈ V is incomparable with x ∈ V iff there is neither x <V y nor x <V y
relation in P. We denote the incomparability relation as x||y. This relation
is reflexive, but not transitive.
Hasse Diagram is a graphical representation of a finite poset P , where each
member of P is displayed as a node, and an edge connects y to x if x ≺ y.
Given that the nodes are labeled, a Hasse diagram uniquely determines a
partial order. For example, Figure 5 shows the Hasse diagram of the powerset
of the set S = {a, b, c, d} ordered via subset inclusion.
Fig. 5. Hasse diagram for P (P (S),⊆P )
Maximal Element of a poset P = (V,<V ) is any node x ∈ V , that is not
covered by other nodes. We denote the set of all maximal elements Max(P ).
Minimal Element of a poset P = (V,<V ) is any node x ∈ V , that does not
cover other nodes. We denote the set of all minimal elements Min(P ).
V-poset is a poset P = (V,<V ), where every node x ∈ V is either maximal
or covered by exactly two nodes. An example of non V-poset and V-poset is
presented in Figure 1
Cover various poset is a poset P = (V,<V ), where for each pair x, y ∈ V
C(x) 6= C(y).
Bridge is a node, which is covered with exactly one other node. An example is
shown in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6. Example of bridges
B Order Theory definitions corresponding to N-free
property
Let P1 = (V1, <1) and P2 = (V2, <2) be partial orders with disjoint ground sets
V1 and V2. Let V = V1 ∪ V2. Let M ⊆Max(P1) and N ⊆Min(P2).
Parallel composition is an order Pp = (V,<p) = P1 ⊕ P2, with <p defined as
x <p y ⇐⇒
{
x, y ∈ V1 and x <1 y or
x, y ∈ V2 and x <2 y
An example of a parallel composition is shown in Figure 7.
Fig. 7. Example of a parallel (left) and a quasi-series (right) composition
Quasi-series composition is a poset Pqs = (V,<qs) = P1 ⊗ P2 relative to
M,N , with <qs defined as
x <qs y ⇐⇒
{
x, y ∈ Vi and x <i y(i = 1, 2) or
∃a∈M,b∈N x ≤1 a and b ≤2 y
An example of a quasi-series composition is shown in Figure 7.
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Fig. 8. Example of a QSP decomposition tree
QSP poset P = (W,<) is QSP ⇐⇒
|W | = 1 i.e. P is a one-element poset, or
P is obtained by parallel composition or quasi-series
composition of two smaller QSP posets.
QSP decomposition tree The recursive definition of a QSP poset yields a tree
representation of QSP partial orders by a binary tree, the QSP-decomposition
tree. An example is shown in Figure 8 The leaves of this tree represent one-
element partial orders, and each interior node represents a parallel composi-
tion (label P) or a quasi-series-composition (label QS and sets M, N) of its
left and right child. Order theory provides us with fast algorithms for con-
structing a decomposition tree [14]. Their running time is O(n+m), where
m stands for the number of edges of a Hasse diagram of an input poset.
An order is N-free if and only if it does not contain a subposet on four ele-
ments a, b, c, d with a ≺ b, c ≺ b, c ≺ d and a||c, a||d, b||d. Such a four element
poset is called N-poset.
C Proofs of Theorems
Theorem 1. The result of the Phase Embedding is both a cover various V-poset
as desired, and a proper embedding.
Proof. The GreedyMakeVs(Poset P) algorithm produces a poset, where each
node has at most two parents, and that is a proper embedding of the original
poset. After completing the Coverings(Poset P) algorithm, we obtain a cover
various poset. This algorithm is designed such that the number of parents of
an existing node remains unchanged, and such that any inserted virtual node is
either maximal or has exactly two parents. Thus there is no interference with
the GreedyMakeVs(Poset P) algorithm. Finally, the EliminateBridges(Poset P)
algorithm leaves no bridges. The poset becomes a V-poset, since all bridges get
a new parent, and the covering sets of other nodes do not change. For the same
reason it remains cover various.
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Theorem 2. Consider an embedding E that embeds arbitrary posets of n
elements into posets where every node is covered by at most two other nodes.
Then the virtual complexity of E is at least n216 logn .
Proof. Let Vn be the set of arbitrary posets with n elements, and let Wm be
the set of posets with m elements, where every node is covered by at most two
other nodes. A rough estimate on the sizes of both sets gives us |Vn| ≥ 2n24 , since
there already are this many bipartite posets (with n2 nodes on each layer), and|Wm| ≤ m2m, since every element can have at most two parents.
Thus, if all posets from Vn are to be embedded in some Wm, m has to satisfy
the inequality
m2m ≥ 2n24 .
Expanding this gives the bound in the theorem.
Theorem 3. There exists an embedding E that embeds arbitrary posets of n
elements into posets where every node is covered by at most two other nodes,
which has virtual complexity cn2 log lognlogn (where c is a constant).
Sketch of proof. We will only give a sketch of the proof of this theorem. The
basic idea is to follow the greedy algorithm presented whenever this is sufficient.
This algorithm will not be sufficient in all cases.
However, when this algorithm is not sufficient, we are dealing with a very
dense poset. In this case, we will first search for complete bipartite sub-posets
Ka,b in the original poset, and replace them by a conforming structure, adding
only a+b virtual nodes. A recent extremal graph theory result [2] guarantees the
presence of a complete bipartite sub-poset, when the poset is “dense” enough.
Replacing these until the resulting poset isn’t sufficiently “dense” any more, and
completing with the greedy algorithm, gives the indicated bound.
Theorem 5. Each recursive call EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSPtreeNode w) re-
turns a cover various V-order for a poset corresponding to the QSP tree rooted
in w.
Proof.
– If w is a leaf, EmbedNfree(T, w) returns a one element poset, which is a cover
various V-order.
– If w is a parallel composition, EmbedNfree(T,w) returns a parallel composi-
tion of cover various V-orders P1 and P2 generated for the children of w. A
parallel composition of two cover various V-orders is a cover various V-order.
– In case w is a QSP (M,N)-composition node, the returned poset P must
preserve x ≺ y, x ∈M, y ∈ N . For that reason, first |N |−1 virtual nodes are
added, to obtain a node x, satisfying x < y for any y ∈ N . All added virtual
nodes have exactly two covering elements. Then x becomes a parent of all
elements in M . To avoid the same covering sets, every node in M gets a
second parent (virtual), which is different for any two elements of M . Figure
4 shows the effect of EmbedNfree(T,w) in this case.
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Theorem 6. Let n(P ) = |V | and δn(P ) be the number of virtual nodes inserted
by EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSPtreeNode w). Then
δn(P ) ≤ 2n
Proof. Let QS and Par be the sets of quasi series and parallel composition
nodes in the QSP tree respectively.
Procedure EmbedNfree creates virtual nodes only when called for quasi series
composition node of QSP tree. For a node w = QS(Mw, Nw),Mw, Nw ⊆ V , the
algorithm creates |Mw|+ |Nw| − 1 nodes. Therefore the total node increase
δn =
∑
w∈QS
(|Mw|+ |Nw| − 1) =
∑
w∈QS
|Mw|+
∑
w∈QS
|Nw| − |QS|.
A node v ∈ V can be used as a member of Nw (or Mw) in only one quasi series
composition, so
Nw ∩Ny = ∅ and Mw ∩My = ∅ if w 6= y.
Therefore ∑
w∈QS
|Mw| ≤ |
⋃
w∈QS
Mw| ≤ |V | = n
and ∑
w∈QS
|Nw| ≤ |
⋃
w∈QS
Nw| ≤ |V | = n.
This gives δn ≤ 2n− |QS| ≤ 2n.
Theorem 7 Let h(P ) be the height of poset P and δh(P ) be the increase of h
while performing EmbedNfree(QSPtree T, QSPtreeNode w). Then
δh(P ) ≤ min(h(log(n− h+ 1) + 1), 2n).
Proof. Let QS and Par be the sets of quasi series and parallel composition
nodes in the QSP tree respectively.
To give the upper bound on increase of the height δh(P ), we consider a
modified QSP tree. We observe, that
h(P1 ⊕ P2) = max(h(P1), h(P2))
and
δh(P1 ⊕ P2) = δh(Pi), for i ∈ {1, 2} satisfying h(Pi) = max(h(P1), h(P2))
In other words for w ∈ Par
δh(EmbedNfree(w)) = max
{
δh(EmbedNfree(LeftChild(w)))
δh(EmbedNfree(RightChild(w)))
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We define a QSP* tree as a tree where each parallel composition node has ex-
actly one child. This tree is obtained from QSP decomposition tree, by removing
subtrees rooted in one of the children of each w ∈ Par. Let y = LeftChild(w)
and z = RightChild(w). If δh(EmbedNfree(w)) = δh(EmbedNfree(y)), than
subtree rooted in z is removed, otherwise we remove subtree rooted in y. There-
fore all the subtrees, for which heights of corresponding posets are not propagated
by parallel compositions, are removed from the QSP tree. In QSP* tree every
quasi-series node adds one to the height: |QS ∗ | = h(P ). For w ∈ QS∗ algorithm
EmbedNfree adds plog2 |Nw|q to δh(P ). Therefore
δh(P ) ≤
∑
w∈QS∗
plog |Nw|q ≤ |QS ∗ |plog |Nmax|q ≤ hplog(n− h+ 1)q
≤ h(log(n− h+ 1) + 1).
As we add only 2n nodes in total, δh(P ) ≤ 2n also holds. This gives the
upper bound
δh(P ) ≤ min(h(log(n− h+ 1) + 1), 2n).
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Fig. 11. Example of the PGP key ring not reduced (left) and reduced (right)
